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A B S T R A C T
The 20th century industrialization of agriculture confronted U.S. agricultural cooperatives with
responding to an event they neither initiated nor drove. Agrarian-inﬂuenced cooperatives used two
metaphors, ‘‘serfdom’’ and ‘‘cooperatives are like a family’’ to manage uncertainty and inﬂuence
producer expectations by predicting industrialization’s eventual outcome and cooperatives’ producer
driven compensation.
The serfdom metaphor alluded to industrialization’s potential to either bypass family farmers, the
cornerstone of the economy according to agrarian ideology, or to transform them into the equivalent of
piece-wage labor as contract growers. The ‘‘family’’ metaphor reﬂects how cooperatives personalized the
connection between cooperative and farmer-member to position themselves as the exact opposite of
serfdom. Hypotheses advanced by Roessl (2005) and Goel (2013) suggest that intrinsic characteristics of
family businesses such as a resistance to change and operating according to a myth of unlimited choice
and independence reinforced the risk of institutional lock-in posed by agrarian ideology.
To determine whether lock-in occurred, Woerdman’s (2004) neo-institutional model of lock-in was
examined in the context of late 20th century cooperative grain and livestock marketing. Increasingly
ineffective open markets prompted three regional cooperatives to develop their own models of
industrialized pork production. Direct experience with producer contracting allowed cooperatives to
evade institutional and ideological lock-in.
Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Recent ﬂuctuation in global ﬁnancial markets led a panel of
cooperative leaders to identify uncertainty as the primary
managerial difﬁculty anticipated by cooperatives in the future
(Boland, Hogeland, & McKee, 2011). Likewise, the 20th century
industrialization of agriculture confronted cooperatives with the
challenge of responding to an event they neither initiated nor
drove. When the environment is highly uncertain and unpredict-
able, Oliver predicts that organizationswill increase their efforts to
establish the illusion or reality of control and stability over future
organizational outcomes (Oliver, 1991: 170). This study argues
that cooperatives used two metaphors, ‘‘serfdom’’ and ‘‘coopera-
tives are like a family’’ to manage uncertainty by predicting
industrialization’s eventual outcome and cooperatives’ producer-
driven compensation.§ U.S. Department of Agriculture/Business and Cooperative Programs.
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2213-297X/Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY liThese metaphors are agrarian. Recent research highlights the
impact of agrarian ideology on cooperatives. Foreman and
Whetten (2002: 623) observe, ‘‘co-ops have historically sought
to reinforce the traditions and values of agrarianism through
education and social interventions. Indeed, for many members
these normative goals of a co-op have been preeminent.’’ These
authors studied the tension within rural cooperatives produced by
a normative system encompassing family and ideology and a
utilitarian system deﬁned by economic rationality, proﬁt maximi-
zation and self-interest. They argue that this split in values implies
that cooperatives are essentially two different organizations trying
to be one. To capture the tension between thesemultiple identities,
they focused on a potential family/business divide in cooperatives,
basing this on a duality often noted in cooperative community and
trade publications.
The authors found that respondents wanted their local co-op to
be more business oriented and at the same time, expected co-ops
ideally (e.g., as an ideal organizational form) to be more family
focused. These conﬂicting expectations suggested that multiple-
identity organizations need to be assessed in terms of thecense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1 Hogeland (2013) notes that agrarians attributed farmer decline to the decline in
open markets, not to productivity increases that made farmers redundant. It is
possible that the rapid increases in four-ﬁrm concentration ratios in the red meats
industries some two decades after the industrialization of the beef industry
overshadowed the impact of productivity increases on farmer attrition.
J.A. Hogeland / Journal of Co-operative Organization and Management 3 (2015) 60–71 61individual components of their identity and the tension (or
interaction) between them. Foreman and Whetten regard dual or
multiple identity organizations as hybrids. There are consequences
to hybridity: many members of a hybrid organization will identify
with both aspects of its dual identity, ‘‘and thus ﬁnd themselves
embracing competing goals and concerns associated with dis-
tinctly different identity elements’’ (Foreman andWhetten, 2002).
They conclude that competing goals and concerns foster compet-
ing expectations with consequences for organizational commit-
ment (and I would add, performance).
The split focus observed by Foreman and Whetten can be
regarded as a contemporary expression of a value conﬂict
beginning early in the 20th century over how production
agriculture should be organized. Decentralized, autonomous,
and typically small, family farmers used their skill at deciding
the ‘‘what, when, where, how and why’’ of production and
marketing to reduce the risk of being a price taker at open,
competitive markets. Farmers also diversiﬁed the farm enter-
prise to spread price risk over several commodities. Corporate-
led industrialized agriculture (integrators) by-passed both
markets and independent farmers. Integrators coordinated
supply and demand internally based on top-down administra-
tive control over production and marketing decisions. They
engaged in production contracting with growers who were held
to competitive performance standards and paid according to
their productivity. In contrast, family farmers were accountable
only to themselves.
2. Study overview
Foss (2007) observes that the beliefs organizations hold about
each other or the competitive environment are a key aspect of
strategic management which have been understudied. Beliefs,
which include norms and expectations, are important because they
can be wrong. Cooperatives are often considered to have an
ideological component but how such ideology develops and
persists also has been understudied. This study addresses that gap
by examining how agrarian language and assumptions shaped
cooperatives’ reaction to 20th century agricultural industrializa-
tion. During this era, industrial methods transformed the produc-
tion and marketing of processing vegetables, poultry, beef, and
pork and were initiated for dairy and grains. An historical and
institutional perspective is used to examine how two contrasting
metaphors brought cooperatives to the brink of institutional lock-
in. The study spans the entire 20th century frombeginning to close.
The study opens with a brief discussion of metaphors and
norms then presents a theoretical model of lock-in. Discussion of
the overarching role of agrarianism follows. Discussion then
addresses why the cooperative alternative to corporate-led
industrialization – the 1922 model developed by Aaron Sapiro –
was not palatable to agrarian-inﬂuenced cooperatives (this section
also deﬁnes agrarian-inﬂuenced cooperatives).
Discussion then turns to considering how the disturbing
implications of serfdom paved the way for the agrarian-inﬂuenced
norm, ‘‘cooperatives as a competitive yardstick’’ and the coopera-
tive metaphorical norm, ‘‘cooperatives are like a family.’’ Producer
expectations triggered by ‘‘serfdom’’ and ‘‘cooperatives are like a
family’’ are addressed. Parallels are brieﬂy drawn between
neighborhood exchange in late 19th century rural California and
behavior implied in ‘‘cooperatives are like a family.’’ Parallels are
then drawn between family business traits and cooperative and
producer experience in livestock and identity-preserved grain
markets. This provides a foundation for examining in greater detail
how well cooperative experience in pork and grains corresponded
to Woerdman’s four part model of lock-in (2004). Study conclu-
sions and suggestions for future research follow.3. Importance of ideology, metaphor and norms
Economists have begun studying how cognition and discourse
affect cooperative outcomes (Fulton, 1999). This study continues
that line of inquiry by considering how a dominant ideology like
agrarianism produced words and associations that, for most of the
20th century, arguably had a deterministic effect on farmer and
cooperative perceptions of the future. Even today, few guidelines
or predictions exist that suggest how organizations can manage
ideological conﬂict (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, &
Lounsbury, 2011). Moreover, the difﬁculties of escaping a
hegemonic ideology have seldombeen recognized (Spencer, 1994).
Metaphors are a pithy word or expression meant to evoke a
comparison. They are used to understand one thing in terms of
another (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: 5). Understanding what
metaphors represent and how they emerge and persist can offer
a window into the salient factors inﬂuencing farmer and
cooperative decision-making. Moreover, as in this text, metaphors
‘‘allow for the sorts of story in which overwhelming evidence in
favor of one interpretation of the world can be repeatedly ignored,
even though this puts the assets of the ﬁrm and the position of the
decision-makers at extraordinary risk’’ (Schoenberger, 1997: 136).
Much of what Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) say about norms also
applies to how metaphors are used in this study. For example,
these authors observe that an important function of norms is to
provide predictability in social relationships so that each party can
rely on the assurances provided by the other. Consequently, norms
stress the meeting of expectations in an exchange relationship.
Certainly, the metaphor, cooperatives are like a family, can be
understood in the same manner. Deﬁning norms as commonly or
widely shared sets of behavioral expectations, Pfeffer et al. also
indicate that norms develop under conditions of social uncertainty
to increase the predictability of relationships for the mutual
advantage of those involved. Once they cease to serve those
interests norms break down.
4. Theoretical framework
Twentieth century U.S. agricultural transformation was pro-
found. Early 20th century agriculture was labor intensive,
employing almost half the U.S. workforce on a large number of
small diversiﬁed farms (Dimitri, Efﬂand, & Conklin, 2005). ‘‘From
1900–2005, the number of farms fell by 63 percent while the
average farm size rose 67 percent’’ (Dimitri et al., 2005).
Productivity-enhancing technological change whichmade farmers
redundant also contributed to farm decline1 (Hogeland, 2013).
‘‘Farm operations became increasingly specialized – from an
average of about ﬁve commodities per farm in 1900 to about one
per farm in 2000 – reﬂecting the production and marketing
efﬁciencies gained by concentration on fewer commodities’’
(Dimitri et al., 2005: i).
The core question considered by this study is, ‘‘Why does
institutional inertia persist despite indications that change is
urgently required?’’ (Haase, Roedenbeck, & Sollner, 2007: 1).
Agrarian-inﬂuenced cooperatives did not consider how family
farming could be adapted to capture some of industrialization’s
beneﬁts until close to the end of the 20th century, a delay
indicative of institutional lock-in. Lock-in has been deﬁned as
getting stuck with traditional styles of thinking and acting in a
manner that is hard to escape (Haase et al., 2007: 17; North, 1990).
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notes that lock-in is ultimately about how organizations choose
among alternatives such as competing technologies (North, 1990:
95). Cooperatives could continue their commitment to open
competitive markets (the dominant but suboptimal technology) or
develop a cooperative version of the superior technology,
industrialization. To the degree information is imperfect and
incomplete, choices like this will be made under conditions of
uncertainty that will inﬂate perceptions of how much the switch
will cost.
Woerdman (2004) proposes amodel of lock-in that accounts for
the impact of culture, history, perceptions and learning through
changes in switching costs.2 The latter offer a point of entry to infer
the cultural impact of agrarian ideology on cooperatives’ decision-
making. The model (below), conceptually similar to North (1990),
presumes the following:
1. T2
op
ind
ize
arg
cul
orhe existence of a superior alternative institution or technology
which competes with a dominant, sub-optimal institution.2. The dominant sub-optimal institution exhibits increasing or
stable effectiveness (e.g., problem-solving capacity).3. Pronounced knowledge gaps and uncertainty (incomplete
information) exist regarding the superior institution.4. Large switching costs are required to shift to the superior
alternative.
Self-reinforcing mechanisms are an important dimension of
Woerdman’s model:
In general, a lock-in becomes more likely when there are more
self-reinforcing mechanisms at work, for instance, when not
only switching costs are perceived to be large, but also when
there are substantial network externalities and learning effects
that lower the running costs of the dominant institutional
arrangement. Nevertheless, the costs of switching to a superior
institutional arrangement, for instance arising from legal
problems and cultural resistance, are likely to play a crucial
role in issues of institutional change, precisely because
institutions are made up of formal and informal constraints
[e.g., North, 1990: 68] (Woerdman, 2004: 69).
Culture’s impact on technological decisions can have a potent
ethical dimension, e.g., the prospect of serfdom, which increases
the probability of lock-in:
Culture can be self-reinforcing if the values in a society
somehow favor the dominant institution and somehow reject
the superior institution as unethical. . . The more of these
subgroups of society share common values against the superior
alternative, the higher the information, bargaining and deci-
sion-making costs are and the stronger lock-in is likely to be’’
(Woerdman, 2004: 64).
Thus, agrarian ideology is assumed to be the primary cultural
inﬂuence on cooperatives confronting 20th century industrializa-
tion. Three propositions suggest its impact on cooperatives:1. Agrarian ideology elevated family farmer importance and
requirements to a degree that became culturally difﬁcult for
farmer-owned cooperatives to challenge.2. Behaviors theoretically associated with family-owned enter-
prises were reinforced by agrarian ideology.Woerdman deﬁnes a lock-in as the dominance of a sub-optimal situation (e.g.,
en competitive markets) in the presence of a superior alternative (e.g.,
ustrialized agriculture). Optimality is deﬁned in terms of efﬁciency; industrial-
d agriculture’s normative standard of cost leadership fulﬁlls this criteria. He
ues that his neo-institutional framework accommodates history, learning,
ture and perceptions better than possible with efﬁciency-oriented neoclassical
new institutional economics.3. Agrarianism triggered an institutional lock-in limiting the
cooperative community’s ability to perceive how industrializa-
tion could beneﬁt them.
Ideologically, family farmers were far more than agricultural
producers: theywere the foundation of the American economy and
American values.3 Agrarianism spelled out how respect for family
farmers could be expressed by fostering their survival, welfare,
independence and prestige. This producer-orientation or ‘‘produ-
cerism’’ (Barron, 1997) was arguably reinforced to a considerable
degree by preferences and behaviors that Roessl (2005) and Goel
(2013) associate with family businesses.
Industrialization fostered the belief that once all farming was
done by corporations, family farmers would disappear (Breimyer,
1995; Kirkendall, 1991). Cooperatives believed that they had a
responsibility to protect or buffer members frommarket adversity
(Hogeland, 2006, 2013). These factors contributed to a strong but
inﬂexible organizational culture within agrarian-inﬂuenced coop-
eratives. If family farmers no longer existed, there would be no
need for farmer-owned cooperatives. According to Sorensen, a
culture can be considered strong if ‘‘norms and values are widely
shared and intensely held throughout the organization’’ (Sorensen,
2002: 72). Such normative consistency reduces and contains the
anxiety of dealing with an unpredictable and uncertain environ-
ment (Sorensen, 2002: 73).
5. Agrarianism’s ideological implications
Agrarian ideology begins with the premise that agriculture is
the most basic institution in the economy since all occupations
depend on farmer-produced food and ﬁber. Agricultural prosperity
ensures the nation’s prosperity. Farmer choice is an integral
component of agrarianism: those who want to farm should be free
to do so (Tweeten, 2003). Similarly, farmers should be free to be
their own boss by determining the ‘‘what, when, where, why and
how’’ of production and marketing.
Strategically, the intrusion of factory farming into a landscape
previously dominated by family farming called for a tacit
revaluation of the latter along the lines of a competitor analysis
(i.e., here’s what we can do, here’s what our competitors do, etc.).
But such dispassionate analysis was overruled by the revolution-
ary socio-economic nature of industrialized agriculture. Indus-
trialization challenged the ability of cooperatives to deﬁne and
sustain a social order encompassing family farmers, open
competitive markets, and marketing cooperatives. Anthropolo-
gist Erica Schoenberger comments, ‘‘When these struggles are
sufﬁciently acute, they amount to a kind of cultural crisis inwhich
competingmodels of the social order, and thematerial and human
resources and identities tied to them, are threatened with
devaluation and oblivion’’ (Schoenberger, 1997: 122). To agrar-
ians, industrialization threatened to transform formerly indepen-
dent family farmers to a ‘‘degraded peasantry or at least reduced
to a subsistence basis of existence’’; there was no middle ground
(Ross, 1948: 67).
Agrarian ideology derived its power from the assumption that
‘‘the farm and its problems were something apart and essentially
different from the characteristic phenomena of business enter-
prise’’ (Ross, 1948: 67). The alternative to exalting or deprecating a
part of the total economy was to regard farmers as businessmen
like any others having similar concerns about specialization,
standardization, labor displacement, capital apportionment, credit
provision and market adjustments (Ross, 1948: 67). Similarly,
farmers who wanted more independence could be seen as no3 In 1782, Thomas Jefferson concluded that the moral and social character of the
U.S. depended on the family farm.
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interference in the way their business was conducted.
6. California’s early industrialization
It seems reasonable to assume that agrarianism’s belief in the
pivotal importance of agriculture was shared to some degree by all
U.S. cooperatives. However, unique features of California’s
agriculture, particularly in the Central Valley, predisposed it to
industrialize some decades earlier than the Midwest, Great Plains,
and Northeast (McClelland, 1997). The latter continued to rely on
patriarchal family farm labor and so, for this paper, are assumed to
represent the core domain of agrarian-inﬂuenced cooperatives.
These areas lacked access to the supply of excess ethnic orminority
labor which McClelland indicates prepared California for industri-
alization by 1910. Added to this advantage was California’s legacy
of estate or hacienda productionwhich boosted cultural familiarity
and acceptance of large scale production (Hogeland, 2010).
In 1922, California attorney and cooperative organizer Aaron
Sapiro combined elements of California experience into a model of
cooperative organization and marketing popularly known as
‘‘orderly marketing.’’ Sapiro began by extolling industrialization:
‘‘The factory system is recognized as the key to all forms of
productive industries to-day all over the world-except in
agriculture. . . The farmer is the only part of modern industry. . .
in which you have individual production’’ (Sapiro, 1993: 81).
In general, Sapiro offered a cooperative alternative to producers’
tendency to dump excess supply from bumper harvests on the
market. Instead, cooperatives should provide a home for the
growers’ product and use accumulated inventory to develop new
products to stimulate consumer demand. Investing in processing
or preservation technologies – canning, refrigeration and drying –
would allow cooperatives to release excess production to the
market in a progressive ‘‘orderly’’ manner.
For example, by 1925 Sunkist growers had increased fruit
utilization by transforming oranges from a single hand-held
breakfast fruit to a glass of juice made from multiple oranges. The
Sunkist extractor was speciﬁcally designed to use off-size fruit and
wind-damaged fruit that would not sell as fancy Sunkist table fruit
because all produced the same quality juice (Nourse, 1925). In
1922, Sun Maid scored a consumer success by packaging raisins in
convenient snack-sized boxes called ‘‘Little Sun Maids’’ (Gary
Marshburn, telephone conversation, July 24, 2008; Cotterill, 1984).
The far-sighted orderly marketing norm anticipated the values
of industrialized agriculture, urging cooperatives to guarantee
supply through marketing contracts with some 85–95 percent of
producer-members (Sapiro’s recommended target).4 This commit-
ment could propel the cooperative into being sole supplier of a
particular specialty crop.5 (Such specialization was facilitated by
California’s geographically compact micro-climates).
Sapiro’s model provided a template for important 20th century
specialty crop cooperatives outside of California, notably, Ocean
Spray Cooperative (cranberries) and Welch’s (Concord grapes).
However, Sapiro’s model represented a highly specialized,
marketing-intensive cooperative that was conceptually and
ﬁnancially out of reach of the small family farmers in the Midwest,
Great Plains, and the Northeast who produced fungible commodi-
ties like milk, meat and grains.6 Cooperative philosopher and4 In practice, 60 percent was a more realistic goal. It was possible, said one
observer, ‘‘to get one-third of the growers together in an organization; these can get
another third to join; but no power outside the Almighty can draw the other one-
third in’’ (Kraemer and Erdman, 1933: 120).
5 Specialty crops refer to fruits, vegetables and nuts.
6 Late 20th century cooperative emphasis on adding value to corn by producing
ethanol or other bio-fuels led to the concept of the ‘‘value-added’’ cooperative
which could be considered a contemporary adaptation of Sapiro’s model.economist Edwin Nourse commented on cooperatives performing
agricultural rationing such as orderly marketing:
To be sure, a few cooperatives which stand in a class by
themselves have already attained a degree of success compa-
rable with the best achievements in industrial lines. But these
are in comparatively small branches of specialized agriculture
where economic organization was already on a high level.
Before anything like the same result could be achieved in the
great staple lines of production, where the demand for [price]
stabilization is most acute, there would have to be a fair degree
of concentration of executive responsibility in their operating
organization (Nourse, 1930: 132).
7. Serfdom’s implications
During the 1920s and 1930s – considered a ‘‘golden age’’ of
agriculture – collective action surged. Rudimentary markets and
chaotic distribution channels for basic commodities like milk,
grain, and fruit provided new opportunities for cooperative
marketing. Moreover, new antitrust legislation curbed many of
the horizontally-integrated ‘‘trusts’’ dominating 19th centurymeat
packing, oil, railroads and grain markets.
Nevertheless, as early as 1922, Nourse saw emerging within
agriculturemarket power so centralized and hierarchical it seemed
feudal (Nourse, 1922: 589). Subsequently, the metaphor of
‘‘serfdom’’ was used throughout the 20th century by agrarian-
inﬂuenced cooperatives to suggest how industrialization’s contract
production could reduce entrepreneurial and independent farmers
to the equivalent of hired hands – so-called ‘‘piece wage labor.’’
In 1900, most counties could point to someone who started as a
tenant or laborer and through hard work, luck, sharp dealing or
intelligent cultivation, retired as a landlord owing several farms
(Danbom, 1979: 7). In 1917, Ely introduced the concept of the
‘agricultural ladder’ as amodel of occupational progression to farm
ownership. The ladder showed how the agrarian virtue of hard
work could allow a landless, unpaid family laborer to progress
from being a hired hand and tenant farmer to an independent
owner-operator (Kloppenburg & Geisler, 1985). Yet, the serfdom
metaphor suggested just how tenuous such occupational progres-
sion could be.
Late 19th century farmers formed cooperatives in response to
market exploitation or failure. Although such exploitation affected
farmer costs and returns, as a rule it did not impinge on farmers’
understanding of themselves as entrepreneurial and independent.
Agrarian ideology lauded family farmers for taking on the risks of
farming with a frontier attitude of self-reliance. Such farmers
answered to no one except themselves. The small farmer was ‘‘ﬁrst
of all a self-directing individualist who could be counted on to
resist with vigor the encroachments of outside authority’’
(Robinson, 1953: 69).
Industrialized agriculture brought a new institutional logic7 to
agriculture by putting efﬁciency and proﬁtability ﬁrst and using
vertical integration to bypass farmers’ decision-making power
over agriculture. Industrialization was market driven, seeking
growth in identifying and satisfying consumer preferences.8
Research has indicated that the norms and prescriptions dictated7 Institutional logics provide a rationale for organizational diversity. They have
been deﬁned as overarching sets of principles that prescribe ‘‘how to interpret
organizational reality, what constitutes appropriate behavior, and how to
succeed. . . To the extent that the prescriptions and proscriptions of different
logics are incompatible, or at least appear to be so, they inevitably generate
challenges and tensions for organizations exposed to them’’ (Greenwood et al.,
2011: 318).
8 For example, latent Asian demand for pork motivated the late 20th century
industrialization of the pork industry.
10 As the century progressed and the impact of industrialized agriculture became
clearer, the monopoly engendered by industrialized agriculture was more
accurately described as the ‘‘concentration and centralization of agriculture.’’
When explaining the competitive yardstick norm in 1945, Nourse expressed
concern that large cooperatives could grow and expand intomonopolieswhowould
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markets (Greenwood et al., 2011).
Power, reﬂected in ownership and governance arrangements,
determines which logics will more easily ﬂow into organizations
and be well received (Greenwood et al., 2011). Family logics
formally embedded into an organization’s ownership structure are
a very effective conduit for increasing familial inﬂuences within
the organization. Not surprisingly, farmer-owned cooperatives
believed they had a mandate to protect and foster family farming
(Hogeland, 2006).
8. Expectations
This inductive study proposes that cooperatives used
two agrarian metaphors, serfdom and ‘‘cooperatives are like a
family,’’ to foster cooperative and farmer expectations of
industrialization and cooperatives.9 These expectations gave
producers and cooperatives a way of understanding industria-
lization’s potential impact on family farmers and how co-ops ﬁt
into that scenario. Cooperatives did not know in advance where
and how industrialization would evolve. These expectations
arguably allowed cooperatives to ‘‘manage’’ the uncertainty
associated with structural change they neither initiated nor
desired.
Expectations like these are important because ﬁrms make
promises based on them. In turn, expectations imply that such
promises will be fulﬁlled (Borup, Brown, Konrad, & Van Lente,
2006). Yet, more often than not, expectations are misleading or
wrong, leading to misallocated resources and investment
(Brown, Rip, & Van Lente, 2003). Yet, so little is known about
the dynamics of expectations that it is not clear how mistakes
regarding long-term transitions can be avoided (Brown et al.,
2003).
The term ‘‘expectations’’ should encompass both positive and
negative expectations, e.g., early promises and early warnings
(Nerlich & Halliday, 2007: 48). Serfdom was a negative expecta-
tion; cooperatives are like a family was its positive counterpart.
Expectations are important because they have a ‘‘performative
effect’’ of eliciting action and investment from individuals,
institutions and government. In a broader sense, performative
suggests how new technologies, new identities, or audience
reactions ‘‘come into being’’ (Taylor Nelms, personal correspon-
dence March 27, 2014).
Expectations are meant to command audience attention.
There’s a risk in this – Ferraro, Pfeffer, and Sutton (2003: 5)
argue that ‘‘great theories in social science attain their status not
because they are true, but because they are interesting, and
engage the attention of their audience of experts and practi-
tioners.’’ Serfdom was a disaster metaphor intended to provoke
urgency and action. But what kind of action? By themselves,
metaphors do not indicatewhat actions should be taken andwhen
(Nerlich & Halliday, 2007: 51).
Nourse’s prescription for combatting potential serfdomwas the
normative concept of cooperatives as ‘‘competitive yardsticks’’ ﬁrst
iterated in 1922 (Nourse, 1922). By 1945, he had expanded it into
the argument that cooperatives should intervene in thinly-traded
markets to restore farmer choice through an ‘‘extra bid’’ as the
yardstick concept was popularly called (Nourse, 1945). The
concept of cooperatives as ‘‘competitive yardsticks’’ was intended
to ensure farmer survival by restoringmarket choices precluded by
monopoly. Such choice was essential to the agrarian concept of9 The new ﬁeld of the sociology of expectations examines how recent scientiﬁc
andmedical advances have been interpreted throughmedia ‘‘hope and hype.’’ Since
agricultural industrialization was also driven by scientiﬁc and technological
innovation, such studies have implications for cooperative strategy.family farmers as independent and entrepreneurial.10 From a
pragmatic standpoint, the competitive yardstick norm arguably
gave small producers in particular hope that cooperatives could be
counted on to resolve their market difﬁculties.
There seems to have been little expectation among cooperatives
that producer investment would support these endeavors. In 1922,
Nourse declared, ‘‘The farmer’s need of capital in his own business
dictates that he go no farther aﬁeld than necessary in marketing or
processing undertakings’’ (1922: 597). However, producers’
market access was being squeezed at the same time that
industrialization’s increased scale and global perspective brought
cooperatives into competition with agribusinesses like Cargill,
Continental, ConAgra, and Archer-Daniels Midland (ADM). More-
over, Nourse’s competitive yardstick norm called for cooperatives
to keep a step ahead of the competition in innovation. Between
1954 and 1970, the capital requirements of cooperativesmore than
doubled. After 1962, capital was supplied by debt ﬁnancing, not
from members’ equity contributions (Grifﬁn, 1973: 8).
In 1973, Farmland Industries, then the second largest U.S.
cooperative, tacitly endorsed Nourse’s philosophy: ‘‘The high cost
of capital investment in agriculture requires that a farmer and his
local cooperative use asmuch of their own funds as possible, on his
farm and at the local grain or farm supply cooperative. That means
if a regional [cooperative] can borrow money elsewhere, it should
do so. Indeed, it has a responsibility to do so’’ (Lindsey, 1973: 10).
Expanding despite the 1970s energy crisis and inﬂation required
large regional cooperatives to incur further debt, a pattern that
continued through the 1990s (Duft, 1985; Gherty, 2004).
By the 1970s, apprehension regarding serfdomhad evolved into
the larger issue, ‘‘Whowill control U.S. agriculture?’’ (North Central
Public Policy Education Committee, 1972). At this time animal
scientists were on the verge of resolving the health and other
issues (i.e., how to raise large animals under conﬁnement) that
prevented integrated pork production. Serving independent pork
producers was a particular cooperative strength. Irrespective of
equity requirements, the prospect of losing feed sales increased
pressure on cooperatives to rescue producers from a particular
economic destiny.
When cooperatives assume risk on behalf of producers they
exhibit a behavior associated with ‘‘cooperatives are like a family,’’
as discussed in the following section.
9. Cooperatives are like a family
Schoenberger’s observation, ‘‘Strategy is the way ﬁrms envision
a social order and their position in it’’ may explain why agrarian-
inﬂuenced cooperatives, prompted by the serfdom metaphor,
interpreted industrialization as an attack on the established rural
social order (Schoenberger, 1997). This falls within the purview of
cooperative behaviors seen by Nilsson and Hendrikse (2011) as
inherently conﬂictual: member interests as a cooperative group or
society are at odds with the cooperative’s business objectives.
Agrarians like Nourse sought an social order rendered ideal,
stable, predictable, and straightforward by clear boundaries
between what farmers did (e.g., crop and livestock production)act no differently than other monopolies who had exploited farmers. In his
exposition, Nourse objected strongly to Sapiro’s model of cooperative industriali-
zation. An analysis of the competitive yardstick norm using critical discourse
analysis suggests that Nourse’s penultimate goal was keeping rural society in a
balance or equilibrium that was contingent on keeping ‘‘big business’’ at bay
(Hogeland, 2007; Nourse, 1945).
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e.g., manufacturing, transportation and ﬁnance (Nourse, 1945).11
Agrarians saw industrialization as a violation of the natural order
because it combined multiple functions under one roof (Buttel &
Flinn, 1975: 135).
Further contributing to the perception that industrialization
was unnatural was the comparison it evoked with Soviet-style
agricultural collectivization (Robinson, 1953). Many cooperatives
encountered industrialization at a time when vertical integration
was too new and unknown to displace competitive markets as an
economic ideal. Hayek’s inﬂuential book, The Road to Serfdom,
published in 1945, criticized central planning compared with the
efﬁciency and choice offered by competitive markets. That same
year, Nourse proposed the competitive yardstick norm to suggest
how additional competition would improve producer returns and
market choices. Consequently, agrarianism’s vaunted ‘‘freedom
for’’ market choice could also be seen as a ‘‘freedom from’’ the
coercion associated with industrialization’s hierarchy.
Corroborating empirical evidence of Nourse’s prediction of
serfdom further heightened cooperatives’ concern. By 1981, USDA
economists noted how industries of small, scattered, independent
producers selling through open markets became the basis for
highly concentrated, integrated, and industrialized agricultural
subsectors (Reimund, Martin, & Moore, 1981: 3). They concluded
that industrialization disproportionately affected the small pro-
ducers who represented the majority within the ﬁrst subsectors to
industrialize – broilers, fed cattle, and processing vegetables.
Initially, these growers produced as a sideline, risk management
strategy of diversifying the farm enterprise. Products were sold in
local markets; producers could enter or exit production easily.
Within twenty years (e.g., 1954–1974), economists observed
industrialization’s greater capital intensity raise productivity.
Processors gainedmanagerial and decision control through grower
production contracts. Conditions of exit and entry became more
difﬁcult for growers (Reimund et al., 1981: iv).
Agrarian ideology situated family farming within a complex
socio-economic normative framework. Such multi-dimensionality
made it much harder for farmer-owned cooperatives to see how
they could beneﬁt from industrialization. Even by the end of the
twentieth century, it was not clear whether producers should
resist industrialization or try to capture part of the beneﬁts
(Hayenga, 2000). In contrast, the primary norm of industrialization
was simple and direct: the low-cost producer survives (Draben-
stott, 1995; Hogeland, 2006). Under these circumstances, there
was no readily available or obvious solution for cooperatives.
Groups and organizations have different criteria – or, in the case of
family farmers, different commodity orientations – for evaluating
an organization because they make different demands of it. This
complexity prevents such conﬂicts from being resolved through
maximization or other simple calculations (Pfeffer & Salancik,
2003: 93).
Management theorists have observed that mid-century [inves-
tor-owned] ﬁrms who initially considered themselves a ‘commu-
nity,’ a ‘family,’ or simply a coalition of stakeholders eventually
adopted a ‘market’ metaphor (Ferraro et al.). This metaphor
allowed ﬁrms to see employees as commodities that can be
acquired, dismissed, or even exchanged through mergers and
acquisitions. As the pace of industrialization quickened, fear of
undergoing a similar cultural transformation arguably led11 Was Nourse an agrarian? He endorsed industrialization (1930) but added a
caveat: ‘‘cooperatives simply represent an effort to devise a form of control which
will permit of the beneﬁts of large-scale organization but will restore the
independence and utilize the personal contribution of the many under thoroughly
democratic principles’’ (1922: 589). His emphasis on independence reﬂects belief in
a core agrarian principle considered antithetical to industrialization.cooperatives to intensify what was ‘‘cooperative’’ about their
business.
As the century advanced and farm numbers continued to
decline, cooperatives intensiﬁed calls for greater cooperative
commitment and loyalty. Cooperatives routinely used member
education to enhance producer commitment. However, a more
subtle and personalized way of stimulating loyalty is presented by
Fulton (1999). He argues that member commitment to a
cooperative depends on an advantage not obtainable from investor
owned ﬁrms (IOFs) such as an ideology which espouses particular
outcomes. Fulton suggests that collective action problems can be
overcome if members get a private beneﬁt in addition to the
collective one.
One adjustment to industrialization was open to all coopera-
tives: how they related to producer-members. The metaphor,
cooperatives are like a family, reﬂects how cooperatives personal-
ized12 the connection between cooperative and farmer-member to
position themselves, in amanner of speaking, as the exact opposite
of serfdom (Rich, personal communication,March 2013; Hogeland,
2004; Wells, 1996).
Within the organizational values and behaviors associatedwith
the metaphor cooperatives are like a family is considerable room
for managerial ﬂexibility, private beneﬁts, and special consider-
ations (i.e., late harvests, a small window for planting, etc.).
Interviews with some 30 local and regional cooperative managers
led Hogeland (2004) to identify values which arguably provide a
basis for the private beneﬁts suggested by Fulton: B1
Ri
re
1
th
beeing altruistic, not exploiting the business for a proﬁt;
 Emphasizing service over making money;
 Valuing the ‘‘small and personal’’ over the ‘‘large and imperson-
al’’; Displaying an unwillingness to let go of relationships, things, or
places; Allowing a cooperative to assume risk on behalf of producers;
 Attaining cooperative self-sufﬁciency to minimize farmer
dependency on those perceived as outsiders; Preferring to subordinate individual goals to the good of the
whole; and Valuing equality (‘‘treating everyone equally’’).
These behaviors are assumed to deﬁne the metaphor, ‘‘coop-
eratives are like a family.’’
This metaphor suggests that farmers saw cooperatives through
the lens of their own family orientation. Indeed, Goel (2013)
anticipated such overlapping between family and business
subsystems. Manager observations suggest that the boundaries
between cooperative and farmwere blurred, allowing cooperatives
to be seen more as a lenient parent than as businesses subject to
market constraints. For example, if producers produced a fruit
variety or size not demanded by themarket, the cooperative might
quietly absorb the loss in revenue from marketing such fruit. In
effect, such producers shifted their price risk to their cooperative.
The implicit social contract implied in the ‘‘cooperatives are like a
family’’ metaphor presents an example of another characteristic of
family enterprises hypothesized by Roessl (2005): the existence
of informal structures which are not necessarily explicit.13
Historical evidence from 19th century rural California suggests
that exchange between family farmers and neighbors also involved2 ‘‘Personalizing’’ is an anthropological concept drawn from Wells (1996) and
ch (2010) reﬂecting how participants in a potentially exploitative economic
lationship act to increase their agency and reduce exploitation.
3 Nor would such institutional structures be transparent as that would defeat
eir purpose of providing the necessary cooperative ﬂexibility to provide private
neﬁts.
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strong communities similar to those they had left behind fostered a
complex economic culture that straddled an agrarian past and a
cash-based modern economic order. The informal economy
represented debts that were rarely ascribed a precise value,
almost never explicitly balanced, nor held to a strict timetable for
repayment. A loose system of barter prevailed.
These obligations arose primarily from the need for harvest
labor but day-to-day tasks such as farm maintenance, transpor-
tation, and meals were also important. The family dimension
was a signiﬁcant aspect of the informal economy because family
members could provide services to offset ‘‘debt’’ incurred by the
household head. ‘‘A farmer’s ability to operate successfully
depended in large part upon his willingness to be lenient when
he dealt in particular goods and services. If he acted otherwise,
he ran the risk of offending his neighbors and thus jeopardizing
his personal reputation and by extension his credit’’ (Welker,
2013: 405).
The easy-going nature of the informal economy hints at
farmers’ unwillingness to be boxed in. Next, discussion turns to
the overlap between agrarian ideology and family business
characteristics regarding the pivotal importance of choice and
independence.
10. Family business characteristics and agrarianism
Agrarianism argued that farmers needed independence and
market choices to survive. Indeed, founding father Thomas
Jefferson considered freedom and independence to be farmers’
birthright. The freedom to choose gave farmers their status as risk-
taking entrepreneurs. Choice was also integral to farmer identity:
‘‘Without choice,’’ said cooperative educator Owen Hallberg in
1980, ‘‘a man is but a number, an instrument, a thing’’ (1980: 21).’’
Roessl (2005) hypothesizes that family businesses tacitly
embrace amyth of unlimited freedom of choice and independence.
For family farmers, choice meant a freedom from interference that
allowed them to be ‘‘their own boss.’’ This emphasis was consistent
with ‘‘living in aworld where people will and ought to pursue their
individual interest above all else’’ (Ferraro et al., 2003).
The myth of unlimited freedom of choice and independence
implies, as Roessl suggests, that cooperation requires a willingness
to forego other options. Cooperatives’ overriding agrarian-inﬂu-
enced need to ensure producer choice arguably prevented them
from seeing open markets as an outdated method of coordination.
This can be seen from a snapshot of 20th century open markets
for livestock. For most of the century, there were no objective
measurement technologies that could measure the animal’s
‘‘percent lean.’’14 Visual inspection was the norm. Consequently,
at open competitive markets such as auctions and terminal
markets15 animals were marketed in lots with the producer
receiving the average market value of the lot. The rationale for
open markets was their potential to provide price premiums that
would reward producers with lean animals. Unfortunately, open
market prices were not sufﬁciently ﬁne-tuned to distinguish
between superior and poor quality, thereby penalizing better
producers. Moreover, consumer preferences for lean meat were
inadequately addressed by average pricing. This may explain why
the white and red meat industries were among the ﬁrst to be
industrialized. In fact, clinging to obsolete products and production14 The scientiﬁc orientation of industrialization fostered objective measurement
to determine the ‘percent lean’ or yield of a hog carcass by using a probe tomeasure
back-fat thickness and the loin eye. This post-slaughter measurement ﬁne-tuned
the price-quality relationship by providing incentives and feedback which farmers
could use to improve production.
15 Terminal markets originated at the end of a rail line. Famous terminal markets
were the Chicago Stockyards and the Kansas City Stockyards.technologies and preferences for maintaining the status quo are
other characteristics of family businesses identiﬁed by Roessl.
Roessl also hypotheses that family-owned businesses are
associated with values or tendencies that can limit cooperation
and cooperative behavior. This is evident in the light touch or even
‘‘hands off’’ approach preferred by farmers from the organizations
they owned (Hogeland, 2013). In 1935, H. E. Babcock famously
declared: ‘‘I regard a farmer-owned, farmer-controlled cooperative
as a legal, practical means by which a group of self-selected, selﬁsh
capitalists seek to improve their individual economic positions in a
competitive society’’ (Babcock, 1935: 42). To this way of thinking,
‘‘if the farm was proﬁtable, the cooperative did not have to be’’
(Stokes, 1957: 12).
11. Other contributions to institutional lock-in
The potential for exploitation hardened farmer attitudes and
fostered an ‘‘insider/outsider’’ culture where farmers were
reluctant to trust non-farmers (Hogeland, 2010). This is suggested
by a 1923 editorial in Successful Farming: ‘‘Just as sure as the
packers, the great bankers, the leading manufacturers or the big
corporations propose something that their business experience has
shownwould be beneﬁcial to. . . the farmers. . . the farmers assume
an aloofness that is dramatic’’ (1923: 8).
An insider/outsider culture can also be seen as a preference for
predictability and stability, as in the following characteristics
identiﬁed by Roessl: A resistance to change in organizational cultures; a preference
for maintaining the status quo. Clinging to obsolete products and production techniques.
 Difﬁculty questioning existing business strategies.
Hogeland (2001) studied cooperative receptivity to the late
20th century innovation of identity-preserved grains (which
prompted the industrialization of the grain industry). Study
ﬁndings suggest the existence of an insider/outsider dimension,
a preference for maintaining the status quo (including obsolete
products) as well as difﬁculty questioning existing business
strategies.
In this study, surveyed local (locally-owned) cooperative
managers classiﬁed their cooperative as either: an Innovator
(being ‘‘ﬁrst’’ is a priority); Follower (willing to innovate but more
cost sensitive); or Status Quo (conservative, cautious, slow to react,
and independent). Each category represented one-third of
respondents.
Innovator-respondents handled amuch greater IPG volume than
Followers and Status Quo. Interdependence demonstrated through
partnering with regional cooperatives and investor-owned ﬁrms
(IOFs) appeared to underwrite Innovators’willingness to bet onnew
products. The more traditional and independent cooperatives
appeared to retain the independence and isolation that is the
historical norm of grain cooperatives, including a competitive, even
adversarial relationship with regional cooperatives.
Unlike Innovators, Status Quo and Followers saw less evidence of
producers adopting IPG in their marketing territory. They preferred
to focus on getting the best price for producers through a
unidimensional focus on traditional marketing practices such as
arbitrage. In contrast, Innovators operated in a multidimensional
world where many avenues and perhaps some money-losing
detours could ultimately achieve a similar end (Hogeland, 2001:
p. iii).
The concept of multiple closed and self-contained business
systems functioning in relative isolation from others – similar to
Nourse’s 1945 concept of the ideal economy and Status Quo grain
cooperatives – strikes Djelic and Quack (2008) as outdated. They
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are incompatible with organizational involvement in multiple
institutional environments (e.g., transnational) with different and
sometimes conﬂicting rule systems.
12. Lock-in and cooperative experience
Following is a brief summary of how each feature of lock-in
identiﬁed by Woerdman corresponds to problematic aspects of
industrialization encountered by cooperatives.
12.1. Existence of a superior alternative institution or technology
Industrialized agriculture was broadly superior to open
competitive markets because it streamlined production and
marketing to lower transaction costs.16 The multiple choices
prized by agrarian ideology and family farmers came at the cost of
excess handling from a marketing system containing too many
middlemen, i.e., commission agent, dealer, handler or broker. Each
time livestock were transferred from one marketing agency (or
location) to another they were watered, fed, and sorted, delays
which put them at risk of going ‘‘out of condition’’ (chieﬂy, gaining
excess weight).
Grainwas similarly vulnerable to loss of condition due to selling
practices like arbitrage and the industry’s practice of commingling
and blending lots for an average (No. 2) quality. Such mass
marketing required end users to adapt grains to their speciﬁc
requirements.
Economists were aware of the consequences from ‘‘duplication
of effort.’’ In 1922, Nourse suggested that the ‘‘despisedmiddleman
system’’ added an unnecessary layer of costs that could be
eliminated if farmers controlled the marketing system and
operated on a strict cost-of-service basis (Nourse, 1922: 590,
583). In his opinion, middlemen and further processors heaped
commissions and monopoly proﬁts on food marketing through
product and brand proliferation – activities which seemed
frivolous and pointless. Nourse sourly concluded, ‘‘’Salesmanship’
so-called has become our god’’ (1922: 580). Too often farmers and
cooperatives agreed, believing that money spent on product
development andmarket research shortchanged producer returns.
Reluctance to identify and respond to buyer preferences can
also attributed to a general sense among farmers and cooperatives
that buyers were adversaries who took income from farmers by
driving down the price of food. This perspective conceivably
limited cooperatives’ ability to seemodern consumermarketing as
a source of revenue that could counterbalance industrialization’s
emphasis on cost minimization.
12.2. The dominant sub-optimal institution exhibits increasing or
stable effectiveness (or problem-solving capacity)
‘‘An increasing or stable problem-solving capacity of the
dominant arrangement is a necessary self-reinforcingmechanism’’
(Woerdman, 2004: 68). However, by the 1980s openmarkets were
beginning to create more problems than they solved. The number
of bids livestock producers received was declining noticeably: a
1987 survey indicated producers uniformly reported receiving one
bid less than they had received ﬁve years earlier (Hogeland, 1988).16 An agrarian perspective on transaction costs is supplied by economist Harold
Breimyer (1995: 197): ‘‘Insofar at the doctrine of minimization of cost and
maximization of consumer satisfaction is taken seriously, the responsible
economist must follow the lead of the Nobel Laureate Douglass North in looking
into the big wastage of transaction costs. If we were truly concerned to treat our
consumers as well as our resources permit, wewould ﬁnd away to deliver products
to them without all the hoopla and ballyhoo that are the mark of today’s
merchandizing.’’In the grain industry open markets were also counterproduc-
tive. Producer-members and managers of local cooperative
elevators preferred arbitrage over making formal commitments
to market grain through an integrated cooperative grain system
(Turner, Heifner, Nichols, & Wisner, 1978: 16). ‘‘Optimal use of the
facilities individually did not result in optimal use of the facilities
as a system’’ (Ginder, 1991: 16). In sustaining marketing facilities
that were underutilized the cooperative sector incurred a high
level of debt. An agricultural depression during 1983 led producers
to rebuke cooperatives for having ‘‘toomuch cooperative baggage,’’
such as bureaucracy, inefﬁciency, and excess capacity’’ (Cook &
Ilipoulos, 1999: 527). In 2002, Farmland Industries reduced
cooperative involvement in the grain industry to the post-harvest
‘‘ﬁrst handler’’ local cooperative level by selling many cooperative
assets to Archer Daniels Midland (ADM). Farmland Industries also
ﬁled for bankruptcy that year.
Producer goals like ‘‘getting the market ‘top’ [price]’’ through
arbitrage interfered with the straightforward movement of
commodities to their ultimate destination. Seeking the ‘‘continu-
ous throughput’’ of the factory line in moving commodities from
one stage of production to another, industrialization’s vertical
integration lowered transaction costs compared with the hit-or-
miss coordination of open markets.
The advantages of vertical integrationwere particularly evident
in pork production. Hogs were systematically moved from one
stage of production to another according to their biological
requirements. For example, feeder pigs progressed from the
nursery to grow-out to ﬁnishing to market (ready) hogs. Each
stage was accompanied by speciﬁc feeding regimens and potential
housing adjustments. Moreover, consistent genetics meant that
the hogs were predictably lean with standardized pork cuts.
Open competitive markets did not foster such consistency
because producers were free to choose when andwhere tomarket.
Farmers might risk commodity deterioration by waiting for
markets to improve. Producer willingness to buy genetics from
farmer-breeders further contributed to product inconsistency.
12.3. Pronounced knowledge gaps and uncertainty (incomplete
information)
In17 1995, survey results from 670 locally-owned feed and grain
cooperatives revealed that theMidwestern federated system linking
regional and locally owned cooperatives could boost cooperative
prominence in the pork industry (Hogeland, 1995). Yet, debate over
cooperatives’ future role was complicated by themassive structural
changes overtaking the industry. In overhauling production and
marketing as they had been known, the pork industrywas assuming
characteristics of a completely new (or emerging) industry, notably,
a high degree of uncertainty. No single production technology,
breed, or production facility (pork building) had been sufﬁciently
proven to become the industry standard.
The transition from single-site farrow-to-ﬁnish production to
multi-site production within the 1980s is a striking example of
how swiftly perceptions regarding the most efﬁcient technology
can change.
In the early 198Os, the reigning technology for hog production
was farrow-to-ﬁnish in self-contained conﬁnement units. As hog
production became specialized in two- or three-site production (i.e.,
a feeder pig production unit, nursery, and ﬁnishing ﬂoors), the
technical dimension of raising hogs increased. Multiple sites
accommodated all-in, all-out production (AIAO) where hogs of
the same age were moved as a group from one site to another to
allow complete cleaning and disinfection between litters. AIAO
reduced the disease potential inherent in the mix of ages and17 Both this section and the following draw on Hogeland (1995).
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facility-dependent innovation, split-sex feeding (feeding barrows
and gilts separately), AIAO reduced variability inmarketingweights
not attributable to genetic diversity. Greater consistency in
slaughter weights enabled packers to automate part of the kill line.
By 1995, AIAO had caught on among all sizes of Iowa producers
at the nursery stage, but only about a third of those surveyed used
this practice in the grow-ﬁnish phase of production. To capture the
advantages of AIAO or split-sex feeding, the typical Midwest
farrow-to-ﬁnish facility needed to be remodeled by adding walls
and pit dividers to make ﬁnishing rooms with new ventilation
systems, etc. Despite these technological advances andwidespread
perceptions that Iowa’s infrastructure was aging, more than half of
the surveyed producers had no plans to remodel or build new
facilities.
Such turnover in production technologies within the pork
industry is not out of the ordinary. Typically, within emerging
industries, the technologies and products which confer an edge in
the opening phase of an industry are not sufﬁcient to carry a ﬁrm
through later stages of industry development.
12.4. Large switching costs
Despite the uncertainty posed by the pork industry, cooperative
involvement was motivated by the belief that members would be
worse off if integration forced formerly independent family
farmers to become contract growers subject to anonymous
corporate authority. Moreover, the uncertainty characteristic of
emerging industries gave cooperatives reason to believe that
modernizing and upgrading the facilities and techniques of small
producers in particular might allow them to hang on, if not survive
and prosper.
Accordingly, regional cooperatives Land O’Lakes, Farmland
Industries, and Countrymark, Inc., developed cooperative varia-
tions of a ‘‘pork system’’ replicating key advantages of integration
such as standardized genetics, pork buildings and technical
support. These systems included a market element: regional
cooperatives relied on locally-owned cooperatives to market feed
and feeder pigs to pork producers, efforts that were complimented
by collectively-owned slaughter and processing plants. The pork
system developed by Land O’Lakes included a ﬂoor price in the
member contract. By shifting risk from producers to the coopera-
tive, the ﬂoor price can be regarded as an expression that
‘‘cooperative are like a family.’’
Signiﬁcant cooperative involvement continued until, at the end
of 1998, a temporary shortage of industry slaughter capacity
caused hog prices to plummet to 16.5 cents per pound. The break-
even price was 36–40 cents per pound. Integrated systems are
vulnerable to bottlenecks causing interruption in the continuous
ﬂow process from farm to slaughter. The crisis was sufﬁciently
severe to trigger a shake-out of independent producers from the
industry. However, the ﬂoor price in the Land O’Lakes member
contract shielded members from the full impact of the price
collapse. Nevertheless, losses of $26 million ultimately led the
cooperative to transition out of providing a ﬂoor price (Hogeland,
2006). By 2005, the cooperative had sold its pork operations.1818 From this experience came the recognition that cooperatives could serve
farmers better by creating innovative value-added products. That is, cooperatives
would become part of industrialized agriculture but not by becoming indistin-
guishable from those they sought to challenge. Cooperatives also realized that they
were investments which had to be competitive with producers’ other investment
choices. In the decade that followed, cooperatives continued to expand their goals
and outlook. For example, Land O’Lakes sought to apply its broad-spectrum
strengths in food production and branded-product marketing to the task of ‘feeding
the world’ (Policinski, 2010).13. Discussion and conclusions
This study explores the relationship between family businesses
such as family farming and cooperation by examining the overlap
between agrarian ideology and characteristics of family businesses
hypothesized by Roessl (2005) and Goel (2013). This connection is
explored in a particular context: the 20th century industrialization
of agriculture. This period challenged the primacy of family
farming in U.S. agriculture through the spread of a competing
corporate-led model of production based on vertical integration.
Decisions ordinarily made by family farmers such as what to
produce, where, and when, and for what market were co-opted by
corporate hierarchy. Agrarian ideology conditioned family farmers
and farmer-owned cooperatives to see industrialization’s contract
growers as the equivalent of hired labor or – worse – as ‘‘serfs’’
subject to a new kind of feudal hierarchy.
Metaphors like ‘‘serfdom’’ and ‘‘cooperatives are like a family’’
are important because they show how agrarian-inﬂuenced
cooperatives and farmers represented the world to themselves
and how they perceived the conditions for action in that context.
The term ‘‘serfdom’’ reﬂected farmers’ belief that they would be
victimized by industrialization’s restrictive production contracts.
‘‘Cooperatives are like a family’’ reﬂected the efforts of cooperative
managers to compensate by upholding the dignity and indepen-
dence of farmer-owners.
The primary method cooperatives used to compete with
industrialization for most of the 20th century was the market-
stimulating competitive yardstick norm. In effect, this norm sought
to turn back the clock to the pre-industrialization era when open
markets gave family farmersmore choices. This emphasis supports
Roessl’s hypotheses that family businesses are driven by a myth of
unlimited free choice and independence and tend to cling to
outdated technologies.
The question motivating this study is why institutional [or
organizational] inertia persists despite indications that change is
urgently required. This study attributes delay to agrarian ideology
which was proposed to work in the following way: First, agrarian
ideology elevated family farmer importance and requirements to
a degree that became culturally difﬁcult for farmer-owned
cooperatives to challenge. Second, agrarian ideology reinforced
behaviors theoretically associated with family-owned enterprises.
Third, these factors triggered an ideological lock-in limiting
cooperatives’ ability to see industrialization as a mix (from their
standpoint) of both positive and negative aspects.
Woerdman (2004) argues that the potential for lock-in is
revealed by four conditions: a superior technology competes with
a dominant sub-optimal technology; the latter continues to be
effective; little is known about the superior technology, and high
switching costs are required to implement it. In his model, culture
is a particularly strong self-reinforcing mechanism when the
superior technology is rejected as somehow unethical. Moreover,
‘‘when a superior alternative exists but is barely known among
thosewho choose, other inputs are beliefs and expectations shaped
by both personal and collective experiences and culture’’ (Woerd-
man, 2004: 66).
For most of the 20th century, the pejorative term, ‘‘serfdom’’
substituted for direct cooperative and producer experience with
industrialization. Woerdman (like North) argues that cultural
change is a slow process which can take years, even decades. It is
likely that the metaphor of serfdom, and agrarian ideology in
general, fostered such preconceived notions of industrialization
that beneﬁts were largely inconceivable. As Schmid says, ‘‘We see
what we have a language to see’’ (2004: 267).
Moreover, industrialized production was capital intensive and
large scale which meant switching costs were high. However, by
the late 20th century, severely declining market competition
19 The word ‘‘straightjacket’’ perfectly captures how independent family farmers
anticipated being immobilized by contract production.
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functions like price discovery and market-clearing. The unlimited
free choice sought by producers came through a market system
with too many middlemen (marketing agencies). Duplication of
effort increased marketing costs. Open market failure forced
marketing cooperatives to consider alternatives. Moreover, com-
pensating farmers through the attributes of ‘‘cooperatives are like a
family’’ did not respond to the core problem presented by the
serfdom metaphor: the reduction in producers’ decision-making
authority in contract production.
Woerdman indicates that lock-in can reversed to become
institutional ‘‘break out,’’ especially when ‘‘traditional ﬁrms
possessing. . . large ﬁnancial means commit themselves to the
development of this [superior] trajectory’’ (Woerdman, 2004: 75)
(Break-out implies the superior technology is adopted). The
variations of industrialized pork production developed by Farm-
land Industries, Land O’Lakes and Countrymark in the late 20th
century had strong market elements in sourcing feeder pigs and
feed but nevertheless represent such development.
Direct cooperative experience with producer contracting
reduced switching costs in a setting where limited information
and uncertainty about industrialization would have otherwise
prevailed. Direct experience also weakened the power of the
serfdom metaphor, allowing cooperatives to evade ideological
lock-in. Reducing switching costs is the key to organizational
transformation. This requires leaders who can recognize when the
old culture has become counterproductive, and can envision and
impose a new culture. ‘‘The essence of leadership, in this context, is
the ability to step outside one’s cultural assumptions in order to
effect the change’’ (Schoenberger, 1997: 119).
It is also possible that farmer decline had to reach a critical
threshold which represented a point of no return before
cooperatives could question existing business strategies. Green-
wood notes that ‘‘organizations are more likely to abandon an
institutionalized template when facing adverse situations, such as
resource scarcity’’ (Greenwood et al., 2011: 340).
Expectations based on metaphor have intrinsic shortcomings
– they are unavoidably reductionist and selective – highlighting
some aspects of an issue while hiding others. Family farmers
traditionally managed risk through a diversiﬁcation that usually
encompassed livestock production. Under industrialized agri-
culture, the integrator owned the animals raised by the contract
grower. The serfdom metaphor focused on the loss in farmer
identity and status associated with contract production. The
metaphor did not reﬂect how producers beneﬁted from shifting
the risks of market determination and animal ownership to
integrators. By the end of the 20th century, farm lenders
began demanding that producers have a contract in hand
specifying market destination before facility ﬁnancing could be
discussed.
Likewise, the positive expectation that cooperatives are like a
family overshadowed the costs of this strategy to cooperatives. The
most problematic aspect of this construct was cooperative
willingness to assume risk on behalf of producer members. It is
possible that cooperatives interpreted thismetaphor to include the
distributive justice Nourse (1922: 594) counted as a producer
prerogative. If so, then cooperatives likely tried to ensure that
producer-members would receive the return they were implicitly
or explicitly promised. Cooperative interest in seeing producers get
a fair shake in themarketplacemay have led them to put programs
in place via cross-subsidization (without expecting commensurate
equity contributions) to enhance members’ market opportunities.
Cook (2004) regard cross-subsidization as a situation where
ownership rights are misaligned with use, control, investment
incentives and beneﬁt distribution. He observes that such
situations were a contributing factor to recent bankruptciesamong large multipurpose cooperatives (including Farmland
Industries’ bankruptcy in 2002).
In retrospect, cooperatives’ efforts to protect producer-
members from ‘‘serfdom’’ put them under extraordinary moral
and therefore ﬁnancial pressure. The consequences for coopera-
tives suggest that Schoenberger was correct when she concluded
– as quoted in Section 1 – that metaphors ‘‘allow for the sorts of
story in which overwhelming evidence in favor of one interpreta-
tion of theworld can be repeatedly ignored, even though this puts
the assets of the ﬁrm and the position of the decision-makers at
extraordinary risk’’ (Schoenberger, 1997: 136). ‘‘Serfdom’’ was a
polarizing concept. It is possible that narratives which challenged
the universality of the serfdom concept (i.e., that serfdom was
an inevitable and inescapable consequence of industrialized
production) would have given cooperatives an alternative
perspective.
Cook (1997) speculated that the mission, objectives, and/or
goals of cooperatives really are different from investor-owned
ﬁrms. This study situates that difference in agrarian ideology.
Bolstered by its overlapwith traits and preferences associatedwith
family business, as hypothesized by Roessl and Goel, agrarian
ideology was indeed hegemonic.
Did Serfdom Occur? In Section 8, this study draws attention to
the potential for expectations to be misleading or wrong and so
lead to misallocated resources and investment. Consequently, an
important question for cooperative scholars and policy makers is,
‘‘Did serfdom occur?’’ Fieldwork conducted by anthropologist
Ronald Rich (2010) in the Midwestern pork industry from 1998 to
2001 suggests that the producer ‘‘serfdom’’ anticipated by
agrarians was not universal. Because contractors must supervise
many growers with many animals, they cannot fully monitor
grower behavior. The contracting relationship is vulnerable to
moral hazard where incorrect or unauthorized grower actionsmay
not be clearly evident. Consequently,
contractors who exploit growers risk a counterproductive
backlash capable of raising costs and decreasing proﬁtability.
Although both contractors and growers recognize the potential
for inequality and conﬂict in their relationship, Rich concluded
that trust, honesty and personal integrity are more associated
with contracting than conﬂict. Of 27 contract operations he
studied, 20 were farm based, following existing lines of
friendship, neighborhood, work, and kin. These close and
natural associations allow Midwestern family farmers, con-
tractors and growers alike, to manage their participation in
‘exploitative agriculture development more generally’ (Hoge-
land, 2013: 112; Rich, 2010: 109).
Agrarian expectations of industrialization were more pessimis-
tic, i.e., ‘‘An industrial system is implicitly regimented, privately
and publicly. Its internal interdependence is so intricate as to
straightjacket both processes and people’’ (Breimyer, 1995: 4).19
To oversimplify industrialization in this manner was to get it
wrong in a way crucially important to cooperatives: ‘‘Firms can
hold competitive advantages simply because their rivals entertain
erroneous beliefs about them’’ (Foss, 2007: 1). Rich’s ethnographic
ﬁndings present a solid economic basis for contract hog producers
to be an integral part of decision-making. The negotiated context of
pork production, especially among the farm-based contract
operations Rich studied, exists ‘‘in part as a result of the frail
quality of industrial hogs; contractors are reliant on contractees to
raise a distinctly fragile commodity that requires immediate
attention to biological issues (health) and infrastructure (barn
conditions)’’ (Rich, personal communication, May, 2013).
J.A. Hogeland / Journal of Co-operative Organization and Management 3 (2015) 60–7170For decades, agrarian-inspired disaster motifs like serfdom,
straightjacket and feudalism seemed to have limited cooperatives’
ability to see themselves as resilient, able to foster new
institutional designs within industrialization’s complexity. Be-
cause cooperatives appear to have been on the side-lines looking
in, they may not have known it was possible to have a nuanced
response to industrialization. This suggests that cooperatives
should assess future agricultural developments more carefully
before rejecting them.
Why would agrarians regard industrialization in such emo-
tionally freighted terms? Maintaining farmer status and impor-
tance was a core agrarian issue much more important than
identifying a role for cooperatives. Agrarians’ choice of terminology
conceivably reﬂected fears that industrialized agriculture was
revisiting a century-old conﬂict over whether farmers should be
regarded as capitalists (as agrarianism suggests) or radicalized as
workers (Taylor, 1989) (This identity conﬂict may be the reason
Nourse (1945) criticized the Sapiro model for bringing a ‘‘big stick’’
of union-like militancy to cooperation). A close reading of the
competitive yardstick norm led Hogeland (2007: 46) to conclude
that Nourse’s primary concern was the welfare of farmers, not
cooperatives. This was a crucial distinction liable to be overlooked
by agrarians: the two are not the same. Even though cooperatives
are farmer-owned, what is good for farmers – unlimited choice
and independence for example – may not necessarily be good for
cooperatives.
Agrarianism’s inﬂuence on 20th century cooperatives provides
support for Roessl’s concept of ‘‘informal structures which are not
necessarily explicit.’’ Agrarianism added additional often subtle
constraints to cooperative decision-making beyond cooperatives’
role as ‘‘user-owned, user-beneﬁting, and user-controlled’’ orga-
nizations. As this study shows, additional constraints – especially
the impromptu expression of ‘‘cooperatives are like a family’’ – can
raise the cost of doing business and, if taken too far, may jeopardize
the organization’s survival.
On a day to day basis, agrarian values and goals can be
incompatible in key respects with other cooperative priorities as
Foreman and Whetten (2002) indicate. The extent of this
incompatibility is seen by Greenwood et al. (2011) as an indicator
of organizational complexity. Further researchmight foster greater
transparency in cooperative decision-making by examining
agrarianism’s impact. Does evidence suggest that agrarian priori-
ties have become a ‘‘taken for granted’’ unchallenged aspect of day-
to-day cooperative transactions? If not, how are trade-offs
between agrarian and economic priorities negotiated?
Alternatively, because institutions seek to instill and reproduce
the values they require, membersmust have some need that is met
by agrarian-inﬂuenced marketing cooperatives. Do members feel
that an agrarian identity or connection increases cooperative
legitimacy and trustworthiness? To what extent does agrarian
ideology foster an increase in cooperatives’ social capital relative to
the losses anticipated by Feng, Friis, andNilsson (2015) in response
to increasing organizational complexity among cooperatives? If so,
how does this connection position cooperatives for competitive
advantage? Is family always the most salient expression of
ideology for members? How does an agrarian-inﬂuenced cooper-
ative identity inform the self-concept or identity of producer-
members?20 Much contemporary market research examines how
retail product choices are perceived by consumers to reinforce a
desirable identity or self-concept. Retail products are frequently
status-enhancing or aspirational. How agrarian ideals affect
farmer-members’ service or product choices is not as clear.20 The concept of ‘‘performative’’ suggests that identity is not a ﬁxed once-and-
for-all decision but a ﬂuid concept that is continuously being enacted and
reinforced through choices and experiences.Another research topic is the potential interaction between
agrarian values and metaphors as tools that help cooperatives
navigate the cooperative life cycle. Both the serfdommetaphor and
‘‘cooperatives are like a family’’ positioned cooperatives as a haven
relative to the competitive turbulence spawned by industrialized
agriculture. What kind of metaphor would be useful for a start-up
cooperative with a need for greater member cohesiveness? How
can metaphors help mature cooperatives differentiate themselves
from other agribusinesses?
Many countries, especially those with a feudal legacy or
landowning class, have an agrarian heritage. Further research
could examine how agrarian ideals in various settings affect
cooperative decision-making. Cross-country comparisons could
further clarify how ideology helps and hinders cooperative
development.
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